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Universities’ Third Mission (UTM) is usually defined as all outreach activities in which professors 
and researchers engage in the society differently from what they typically do as lecturers or as 
members of the scientific communities (Gulbrandsen and Slipersæter, 2007). UTM is then 
broadly concerned with the generation and application of knowledge outside the academic 
environment (Laredo, 2007; Molas-Gallart et al., 2012) aimed at fostering economic development 
(Chatterton and Goddard, 2000; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000; Lazzeroni and Piccaluga, 
2003) or simply at engaging with local communities (Neave, 2000; Breznitz and Feldman, 2012). 
Therefore, the range of UTM activities is wide and, furthermore, it continues to encompass ever 
more numerous aspects of academic life. Although earlier studies focused mainly on academic 
patenting and entrepreneurship1, scholars have recently introduced the concept of ‘academic 
engagement’, that in Perkmann and colleagues’ view (2013) means all knowledge-related 
collaboration between faculty and non-academic actors (both individuals and organizations) or, 
in other words, the processes of informal knowledge transfer. The popularization of the ‘public 
engagement’ issue – namely the activities of communication, consultation and participation of 
an academic in the public sphere (Rowe and Frewer 2005) – has further stretched the UTM 
concept. The most relevant distinction within this blurring conceptual extension could now be 
between for-profit activities (such as creation of new firms or contract-research) on one hand and 
non-profit undertakings (i.e. dissemination of scientific results, policy development, community 
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service, etc.) on the other (Schoen and Theves, 2006). This article specifically addresses the theme 
of for-profit engagement and pays attention to activities undertaken by professors and researchers 
in the economic sphere of life, with specific regard to the activation of University Spin-Offs 
(USOs)2. In Italy, academic entrepreneurship is widespread, even if its distribution among 
universities is uneven. As for USOs’ economic performance, new data on their revenues (see 
section 3) show the coexistence of a group of successful companies with a majority of firms that, 
even after many years, are inactive or present very poor results. This article aims to explain the 
latter phenomenon, namely the large degree of unsuccess of Italian USOs. In particular, after 
reviewing the main determinants that the literature associates with USOs’ poor performance, we 
focus on what we consider a decisive factor that has so far received little attention: the non-official 
reasons that push academics to start new ventures. The argument we propose is that there is a 
wide discrepancy between the officially declared objectives adopted by the academic institution 
at the central level and its actual use at the peripheral level of any academic department. 
According to this perspective, our goal is to contribute to understanding why the official declared 
for-profit goals of UTM policies are not actually achieved, shedding light on other non-official 
reasons underlying the surrogate use of the USOs.   
Results here discussed are referred to three Italian universities – Turin, Florence, and Cagliari – 
and are based on qualitative empirical research carried out within a broader project supported by 
a national grant from the Italian Ministry of Education, University and Research3. 
The article is organized as follows. In the second section we introduce the general issue regarding 
the ways in which universities contribute to economic development at the local and national level 
and, more specifically, on what the literature has already achieved on the UTM hindering factors. 




































































main factors usually called into question to explain the low performance and ineffectiveness of 
UTM activities in this country. The fourth section presents the research questions addressed in 
the article and provides details about methods and cases investigated. In the fifth section, we 
present the analysis of interviews carried out with both academic and non-academic key players, 
focused on the unofficial reasons behind the engagement in a USO. Finally, on this basis, in the 
conclusion we try to summarize, and account for the reasons why, at least in Italy, university 
governance institutions abstain to tackle the surrogate use of USOs.. 
 
2. Theoretical background and context 
 
Sound research results have revealed that universities play a relevant role in economic 
development at the national and regional level (European Commission, 2002; OECD, 2002; 
Lambert, 2003; Shane, 2004; O’Shea et al., 2008). Specifically, a recent study finds robust 
evidence that ‘increases in university presence are positively associated with faster subsequent 
economic growth’, and that ‘doubling the number of universities is associated with over 4% 
higher GDP per capita in a region’ (Valero and Van Reenen, 2016, 33).  
The contribution of universities to economic growth comes from different leverages (Drucker 
and Goldstein, 2007), which have both short-term and long-term effects (Florax, 1992; Stokes 
and Coornes, 1998). The former is seen in the impact of a campus on the local economy with 
regard to faculty and clerks’ salaries as well as students’ daily expenditures and rents (Garrido-
Yserte and Gallo-Rivera, 2010; Schubert and Kroll, 2014). Conversely, long-term effects refer to 
the contribution of tertiary education to the knowledge economy in terms of upgrading human 




































































advanced economic sectors much closer to the technological frontier (Vandenbussche et al., 
2006). Universities also have a large indirect impact on innovation due to knowledge spill-overs 
(Anselin et al., 1997; Breschi and Lissoni, 2001; Jaffe, 1989; Andersson et al., 2004; Ponds et al., 
2010; Wennberg et al., 2011), particularly regarding science-based industries. 
Following the work of Murray and Kolev (2015), understanding how much universities can 
contribute to the economy requires distinguishing between three interrelated groups of factors: 
national, local and individual factors. At the national level, it is important to emphasise the role 
of public innovation policies. In the last 30 years, governments adopted many strategies to bolster 
the impact of universities on economies (Wright et al., 2007). Clear examples of the public 
attempt to promote spill-over effects are well known. One of the most popular is the Bayh-Dole 
Act which, after its enforcement in 1980, changed the United States’ system of technology 
transfer by enabling universities to retain the title to inventions and take the lead in patenting 
and licensing public and privately funded research results (Mowery et al., 2004). Another widely 
used innovation policy concerns the promotion of high-tech clusters, which are geographic 
concentrations of companies, universities and other research organizations all engaged in joint 
activities4. By adopting a typical triple helix approach (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000), cluster 
policies aim to provoke local knowledge spill-overs and to set up institutional governance of 
innovation systems. Moreover, each country adopted its own range of policies (Wright et al., 
2007). In some cases, national governments have bet on USOs’ dedicated finance, providing 
dedicated financing, such-as seed-capital funds (the Netherlands, the UK, Germany, France). In 
others, they have facilitated collaborative relationships between universities and businesses, 
encouraging common investment in R&D (USA, Germany). Furthermore, some countries 




































































At the local level, the success of UTM depends mostly on the organizational engagement of 
universities in knowledge-transfer activities and on their agency capabilities to implement them 
(Phan and Siegel, 2006; Rasmussen and Wright, 2015; Rolfo and Finardi, 2014). In particular, 
empirical findings on American (Siegel et al., 2003) and European (Debackere and Veugelers, 
2005) technology transfer offices (TTOs) show that the quality of staff and organizational 
practices are important to explain performance in commercialization of scientific results. 
Likewise, in the case of USOs promotion, the success rate relies upon many organizational 
factors: the degree of selectivity at the entrance of incubator activities, the provision of incubation 
advanced services and the presence of strong ties with venture capital industry (Clarysse et al., 
2005; Lockett and Wright, 2005; Powers and McDougall, 2005).  
The diffusion of UTM is also grounded on actor-centred features (the individual level). Since 
scientists usually feel it is risky to deviate from the social norm of conducting for-profit 
entrepreneurial activities instead of conducting academic research (Bercovitz and Feldman, 
2003), academic entrepreneurship may present in specific circumstances: when faculty are less 
embedded in academic culture (Lockett et al., 2003; Clarysse and Morey, 2004), in departments 
where the culture of commercialization is most widespread (Rasmussen et al., 2014), or at a later 
stage of their career when they have already built their reputation (Audretsch, 2000; Shane, 
2004). On the other hand, such activities can be performed by ambidextrous academics, namely 
researchers seeking to pursue commercial outcomes while also continuing to produce academic 
ones (Ambos et al., 2008). According to Lam (2011), the latter are hybrid scientists, who act 
strategically by incorporating commercial practices into their repertoire of behaviour. Especially 
in those cases, the goal of UTMs’ commitment is not strictly the profit, but to further research 




































































researchers (Lam, 2007). Academic entrepreneurs can also follow other unofficial reasons such 
as achieving autonomy from the academic organization (Roberts and Wainer, 1971), receiving 
alternative recognition by peers (Stuart and Ding, 2006) or overcoming dissatisfaction with their 
current role in the university (Roberts, 1991). Very often the academic entrepreneur is therefore 
a quasi-entrepreneur or, on in Meyer’s words (2003) an ‘entrepreneurial academic’. This 
ambiguity of entrepreneurial motives can have significant adverse effects on the performance of 
USOs, especially if added to the shortage of business skills among academic entrepreneurs 
(Clarysse and Moray, 2004; Colombo and Piva, 2008; Shane, 2002).  
In summary, we assume that the role of the university in economic development is both 
institutionally rooted and dependent on the organizational agency of the universities. At the same 
time, we suppose that individual motivation of the academic entrepreneur could affect the UTM 
performance. As a consequence, to comprehend the very impact of universities on development 
according to their third mission it is necessary to look at the configurations of institutional, 
organizational and actor-centred features. In the next section we apply this approach to the Italian 
case. 
 
3. Poor and ineffective. The dark side of the Italian UTM. 
 
Although the Italian universities present many good practices in terms of UTM activities, the 
relationships between universities and business are basically lagging behind. The rate of 
universities’ patent filing is among the lowest across European countries, and about one third of 




































































performed by ANVUR5, only 28.2% of Italian university-owned patents have been licensed (or 
sold). 
Conversely, academic entrepreneurship is widespread: in 2013, about eight universities out of 
ten count at least one USO. However, the distribution of such academic firms is uneven: few 
universities have generated many, and many have generated a few. One fifth of the companies 
stemming from Italian university research is concentrated in only four universities. As far as the 
USOs’ performance is concerned, consistent with research results regarding other countries 
(Mustar et al., 2008; Degroof and Rooberts, 2004; Wennberg et al., 2011; Zahra et al., 2007), 
Italian USOs tend to remain small and with few prospects of growth (Salvador, 2006; Lazzeri and 
Piccaluga, 2014). Furthermore, revenues are limited on average, even though USOs’ survival rate 
is paradoxically better than those of non-academic start-ups (Bolzani et al., 2014).  
This scenario of sustainable survival (Migliori 2015) is confirmed by our analysis of USOs’ annual 
financial statements (Tab. 1)6. Our findings show that 15.0% of USOs are inactive, 45.1% have 
a revenue lower than 100,000 euros, while only 4.3% can be considered well-established 
companies, showing over 1 million euros of revenue from sales. The result is the same even if we 
split USOs between start-ups and longer-term businesses7. The average income of the latter 
(350,000 euros) is surely higher than that of the former (94,000 euros), but a large number of 
USOs (13.9%) remain inactive, one third have turnouts lower than 100.000 euros and only some 
of them (7.6%) have results that match the expectations for innovative firms. 
 





































































As we have already pointed out in the previous section, the reasons for weak and less-effective 
results in the Italian UTM activities, depend on the configuration of national institutions, of 
local organizational elements and on actor-centred factors.  
Concerning the institutional aspect, the universities’ autonomy to formally adopt (or not) this 
new mission dates back only to 1989, when Law 168 entitled Italian universities to change their 
organizational structure (statutory autonomy) and gave them greater freedom to allocate the funds 
they received (financial autonomy). What before had been subject to Italian red tape then became 
organizations allowed to diversify their funding channels, including contracts and agreements 
with non-academic subjects, or to take up a specific development strategy, sometimes in 
agreement with local governments (Moscati and Vaira, 2008).  
The second factor, which influenced a late emergence of the UTM in Italy, is about the national 
legislation, but refers specifically to the discipline of technology transfer. On one hand, it was not 
until the end of the 1990s that academics could legally start up their firm. On the other hand, 
changes in intellectual property code aimed to promote a greater role for research in economic 
development was modified only in 20018.  
Another element which can explain the many hurdles in the growth of UTM activity is related 
to public policies. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Italian government mainly adopted interventions 
intended to promote industrial and pre-competitive research through incentives to firms (i.e. Law 
488/1992, Law 196/1997). More direct promotion of university-industry relationships, such as 
tax credit and research grants, was only introduced from 2000 onwards (i.e. law 106/2011). In 
the same years, national and regional governments launched more ‘systemic’ policies by financing 
science and technology parks, centres of excellence, technological districts, technology transfer 




































































case, the limits of Italian innovation policies are well known. According to the European 
Commission, Italian innovation policies have certainly increased in consistency, but the 
persistent lack of resources, the fragmentation into various sectoral strands, the discontinuities 
in time and the absence of an ex-post evaluation of interventions have produced policies that are 
redundant, inefficient and confusing for potential beneficiaries (European Commission, 2008). 
The lack of public funding and the ‘water-can’ style of Italian innovation policies have gone hand 
in hand with the private sector’s more general poor expenditure in R&D. A further ingredient 
of the Italian universities low effectiveness in the economic development concerns their role in 
the socio-economic sphere. On one hand, Italy has one of the lowest degrees of tertiary 
educational attainment among economically developed countries (OECD, 2014). On the other 
hand, Italian firms invest only 0.7% of GDP in R&D activities, whereas in countries such 
Germany and Sweden private businesses invest more than 2% of their GDP (ibidem). The 
combination of low private R&D expenditure and inadequately qualified human capital denotes, 
therefore, an economic growth model where Italian universities play a quite marginal role 
(Gherardini, 2015). 
Despite the lack of an innovative ecosystem, Italian universities have been able to generate quite 
a high number of USOs, even if a in few cases have become fast-growing firms (Baldini et al., 
2015, Lazzeri and Piccaluga, 2014). These successes rely rather on individual factors, such as the 
entrepreneurial skills of the team leading the company (Vohora et al., 2004), the appropriate 
combination of skills in the founding team composition (Chelt and Pittino, 2014), and their 
ability to use their social capital as leverage (Masiello et al., 2015). In other words, the lack of a 




































































strategically as creators of their own ecosystems via networking activities (Visintin and Pittino, 
2016).  
The intervention of some external players - such us venture capitalists, TTOs or incubators – also 
helped some USOs to overcome, at least, the early obstacles (Fini et al., 2009). However, in the 
Italian case, a great part of these organizations is unable to produce the skills, networks and 
advanced services the USOs would need (Cesaroni and Piccaluga, 2016). First, the venture capital 
industry is underdeveloped (Vacca, 2013) and mainly focused on non-academic start-ups (VeM, 
2014). Second, it is a matter of how TTOs and incubators support the technology transfer 
activities. Research findings on the Italian case show that TTOs are usually organized as small 
teams of mainly unskilled employees, and a low-selective model of USO incubating is widespread 
(Gherardini 2012, 2015).  
A further element that helps to explain the limited success of UTM tools in Italy, including the 
poor economic performance of a great number of the USOs, is the frequent mismatch between 
the purposes of academic entrepreneurs and the aims of their university (Chiesa and Piccaluga, 
2000; Fini et al., 2009; Shane, 2004). In general terms, it should be assumed that academic 
entrepreneurs establishes their business to make a profit – which may also be different than 
personal income – and that, likewise, the university promotes USOs to gain some economic 
benefits, which can derive from the exploitation of a university-owned patent licenced to the firm, 
or from a potential sale of the firm’s shares on the market, or eventually to promote regional 
development. This assumption does not find, however, wide confirmation in the Italian case. 
Fini et al. (2009) argued that Italian ‘academics’ involvement in creating new ventures does not 
seem to be driven by entrepreneurial attitude but rather by their expectation of generating results 




































































(2015) to assess that unofficial reasons are one of the main drivers of USOs’ genesis. In particular, 
he highlights that USOs represent relevant employment opportunities for young post-doc 
researchers whose careers are blocked by the reduction of public research funding and, at the 
same time, by a weak labour market for private R&D jobs. In other words, a new firm, even if a 
consultancy or a laboratory which offers basic tests, could be the source of valuable job 
opportunities, and furthermore, a chance to remain in a knowledge-intensive research 
environment (Rizzo, 2015). 
 
4. Research questions and methodology 
 
As stated above, the weak performance of Italian universities’ in third mission activities can be 
explained by taking into account a series of factors and the specific combination they assume in 
relation to the particular situation of each university. Even considering the differences among 
Italian universities and among the socio-economic contexts in which they are embedded 
(Ramaciotti and Daniele, 2015; ANVUR, 2016), it is relevant to note that unsatisfying results in 
UTM can be identified as a common feature, at least in part as an effect of national legislation 
and policies on matters of technology transfer and university-industry relationships. In addition, 
other organizational and individual factors related to the capabilities and strategies of the actors 
involved can also influence the success of UTM activities. In this article, we intend to contribute 
to this debate by introducing and developing a further argument: the low economic success of 
some USOs may be understandable if we refer to the surrogate use through which professors and 
researchers exploit this kind of UTM tool. Commonly, USOs are seen as typical business-oriented 




































































official and expected goal behind the creation of a USO company from the public research base. 
However, in contrast, a USO can also be redirected to different and alternative goals (see section 
3). In this view, our approach puts more emphasis on the actual reasons behind the 
implementation of USOs, assuming a possible discrepancy between the officially declared 
objectives adopted by the academic institution at the central level to promote this tool – that, as 
mentioned earlier, is to gain economic benefits or support technology development/transfer – 
and its actual use at the peripheral level of any academic department. We expect that unofficial 
goals would be intertwined with, rather than replace, official ones: because the discrepancy is a 
matter of degree, we presume that a USO can be steered far from its original mission and 
redirected towards other non-profit goals. From this perspective, our goal is to contribute to 
understanding why the official declared for-profit goals of UTM policies are not actually achieved 
shedding light on other reasons underlying the surrogate use of a typical UTM tool such as the USO.   
In an attempt to answer these specific questions, we use some insights from a wider investigation 
on the spread of UTM activities across 12 Italian universities and on their contribution to the 
development of regional economies (see note 3 for more details) that has been carried out 
through a case-study approach. This research method seemed the most appropriate to us because 
it allows us to explore a phenomenon – such as the actual reasons at the basis of the use of USOs 
– in the context in which it is generated and reproduced, providing in-depth understandings of 
its characteristics (Yin 2003). In particular, among 12 cases investigated we take into account 
those referring to three Italian universities similar in classification by size but with some 
differences relating to the socio-economic context in which they are rooted: the University of 
Turin, the University of Florence and the University of Cagliari. Italy is well known as a country 




































































(Bagnasco, 1977) and still today the dynamism of the northern, central and southern regional 
economies is significantly differentiated from the point of view of investment in research and 
innovation (Eurostat, 2017). Furthermore, a recent study on the conditions of Italian academic 
institutions has revealed a new general trend of increasing inequalities between northern and 
southern universities of the country (Viesti, 2016). Therefore, we have selected three large9 
universities placed respectively in the North (Turin), in the Centre (Florence) and in the South 
of Italy (Cagliari). All three universities rank first in their regional territory for registered students 
and number of departments, show an adequate number of active USOs and have put a growing 
emphasis on UTM as a strategic asset in recent years (University of Turin, 2016, 2017; University 
of Cagliari 2009; University of Florence 2006). That said, as shown in Table 2, the organizational 
configurations of the three universities reveal profiles that only partially overlap (see number of 
researchers and professors, research centres, kinds of courses) and, with respect to some UTM 
activities, their performances also appear quite different (see structure of TTO, patents and 
subcontracting).  
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
The qualitative analysis from which the insights presented here emerge was conducted through 
around 20 semi-structured interviews (see Appendix) at each university from September 2015 to 
December 2016. These interviews were addressed both to academic (vice-rector, department 
director, TTO staff and manager, professors, researchers) and to extra-academic key players 
(entrepreneurs, politicians, key informants) who, for various reasons, have relations and maintain 




































































departments particularly active in the UTM for each university (two related to STEM disciplines 
and two to SSH ones) – on the basis of specific indicators (no. of patents, no. of USOs, 
subcontracting value, etc.) and information coming from TTO’s director and other key 
informants. In particular, the empirical insights discussed in the following paragraph are mainly 
reconstructed through interviews with directors, professors and researchers belonging to 
departments from each of the three universities10. 
 
5. Which unofficial reasons are behind the use of UTM tools? 
 
In this section, we aim to develop our discourse along with the main goal of underlining some of 
the unofficial reasons behind a surrogate use of USOs. In order to do so we take into account 
motivations expressed by both academic and non-academic actors. We agree that the choice to 
shoulder the costs of starting a USO depends on various factors and - as indicated above - 
unofficial reasons are intertwined with official ones, especially when activities are carried out by 
a large research team. As is easy to understand, choices are influenced by the conditions and the 
constraints of the organizational contexts in which actors are embedded as well as individual 
strategies with which researchers and professors try to take advantage of UTM activities in order 
to improve their career opportunities. Therefore, our analytical and interpretative framework 
keeps together the original mission of USOs – based on the purposes for which they were 
introduced in the academic system – with their surrogate use at the micro level, paying particular 
attention to some key dimensions: degree of discretion and autonomy in their activation; 
availability and allocation schemes of resources and research funds; and opportunity structure 




































































Because this article addresses the issue of low effectiveness of USOs and aims to introduce the 
question of their surrogate use as a possible explanation factor, we present some key points 
referring to the motivations underlying a USO activation. Observing actual use of USO allows 
us to immediately balance their spread with the limited success these kinds of firms often meet 
in the marketplace. First of all, as clearly underlined by a venture capitalist talking about UTM 
activities at the University of Cagliari, USOs are hardly innovative start-ups:  
 
Even the most successful university spin-offs are not start-ups, but they are often consulting firms. In my 
mind a start-up is a company with strong growth chance. That is, that the first year it earns one hundred 
thousand euros, the second year five thousand, the third one million, the fourth five million and then it 
aims for ten million. [Spin-offs] are often consulting firms that, in the best cases, have fifteen/twenty 
employees, who do research projects funded by the Region. [Int_11_Cagliari]. 
 
In the following, we draw attention to four points which emerged from the analysis of empirical 
documentation and which are related to the current literature on the alternative motivations of 
an academic entrepreneur (see sections 2-3). We provide a brief description of each point 
introducing some comments from the interviews in order to shed light on the actual reasons 
behind the choice to run a USO.  
First, in some situations, USOs are means to let professors and researchers work with fewer 
constraints: in this sense, a USO  far from being exclusively a strategy of for-profit engagement 
and for entrepreneurship - can become a possible remedy to bureaucratic rigidity and can provide 




































































Here, a respondent argues that the strategies through which academics try to achieve greater 
organizational flexibility can actually result in an economic loss for their academic institution: 
 
To get an idea, even a temporary work collaboration has to pass the audit of Corte dei Conti in Rome. 
It is non-sense that in the past was not there. It is a huge bureaucratic constraint to everything […] There 
are research groups in the department that would earn significantly [from external contracts], but when 
they can they move their business, all those who can, to university consortia, rather than to other similar 
organizations, which are very flexible on these things. I think that our department, the university in 
general, is losing millions of euros because people naturally look for more flexible way to do things 
[Int_9_Cagliari].  
  
In another comment, a professor, founder of a USO and of a research centre with managerial 
autonomy, highlights the importance of being small and slim in order to operate according to the 
tight deadlines and fast speed of the marketplace. What is important here, in a sense close to that 
of Roberts and Wainer (1971), is again the need for greater flexibility and autonomy, guaranteed 
by the agility of a tool as a USO:  
 
This means a certain speed from the administrative point of view [...] Being small and with several 
resources we have a certain speed. We were very fast in the past and today in spite of this centralization, 
due to extreme and exaggerated bureaucracy, we are still able to be fast. [Int_8_Turin]. 
 
Yet, in short, another similar interpretation on this point reveals that the benefit of this tool is 




































































has a faster administration, we are able to reply in real time while the administration needs 12 months to 
do that" [Int_17_Florence]. 
A second possible surrogate use occurs when the actual purpose is to use the USO to hire young 
precarious researchers. As already well-emphasised by other scholars (Lam, 2007; Rizzo, 2015), in 
this perspective an important reason to activate a USO is to find an (alternative) solution to 
overcome the precarious employment of younger colleagues, given the well-known recruitment 
problems and the weak turnover afflicting Italian universities. 
 
Our spin-off is not even a year old, but it has passed the first stage of incubation [...] Labs provided money, 
people working in the spin-off are ones who collaborated with us in the past. Young colleagues who have 
decided they will not be hired by a company have asked me and I have given them financial resources 
and scientific supervision. However, the spin-off has an obligation to reinvest in a fund to be allocated to 
research grants in the lab each year. [Int_17_Florence]. 
 
Even more honest is the response offered by another professor from the same university who 
gives reason to Fini et al. (2009) for whom a USO is not usually driven by entrepreneurial 
attitude.: "For what reason would I have done it? Not because at a certain point in my life I wanted to 
convert myself into an entrepreneur but because I had the opportunity to keep people at work" 
[Int_15_Florence]. In other words, he was giving young researchers a chance in a context 
providing few opportunities due to the dramatic weakness of public and private investments in 





































































We wanted to give the many good, young, talented graduates a chance to prove their worth and […] an 
opportunity to work under permanent employment contracts. Everything is born from our experience as 
professors at the University of Cagliari, where unfortunately we cannot guarantee stability of employment 
to many talented precarious workers who want to do research. [Int_9_Cagliari]. 
 
As we have already pointed out, official and unofficial goals sometimes coexist in the decision to 
launch a USO. In the case presented below, according to Lam’s ideal type (2011) of the strategic 
hybrid scientist, a USO is seen as a profitable option in order to meet the marketplace but, at the 
same time, also as an opportunity to create job positions for young researchers:  
 
The spin-off was an activity already carried out within the department but without a business model, so 
the idea was to create a business and make a certain number of research fellows work there […] That’s 
why there are market opportunities and then there is a need to place people who carry out research 
activities in the departments, so the logic is to satisfy the people who work by giving them a for-profit 
activity. [Int_12_Turin].  
 
Third, looking at how mechanisms for accessing funds for research projects tend to be thought 
and set, having a USO as member of a network becomes useful thanks to the possibility of 
presenting it as a firm partner in designing research projects and calling for proposals. In fact, 
some calls for funding explicitly require the presence of a company partner or such a company 
can otherwise represent an advantage in terms of opportunities for being selected and receiving 




































































links individual strategies to continuous retrenchments and cuts in public spending for university 
research both at the national and at local level: 
You probably do it because of your entrepreneurial spirit, to earn something. But also because it helps to 
simplify the management of some activities [...]; meaning that I can hire a person for three months on the 
fly and I do not have to wait [...] Or they can be the mandatory enterprise-partner in a research project, 
[...] an instrumental actions adopted because, maybe, you need three companies and instead of inventing 
a third one you take the spin-off and solve the problem.  [Int_4_Cagliari]. 
 
The fact that in practice this reason can prevail over the official objectives and over the original 
profit orientation is also confirmed by a professor from another university: 
 
There are spin-offs that are born with good intentions and win the market because the idea was good; 
and spin-offs that are born with either good intentions or with the intention of making a legitimate tool 
for participating in projects. It would require a monitoring process. [Int_5_Florence]. 
 
Lastly, the fourth point is in part closely related to the first one. A USO can also be a strategy to 
sustain networks feeding relationships with other non-academic partners, located both in the 
local context and in other countries. For example, also referring to the intuitions of D’Este and 
Perkman (2011), keeping in touch with the R&D division of a company in terms of developing 
research lines, sharing labs and scientific equipment, exchanging knowledge and transferring 
technology may be easier for a USO which, as mentioned above, usually has a streamlined 
structure (with greater flexibility and faster response times) compared to that of a university 




































































exchanges and a tool for being operative in the marketplace and pursuing strategies by following 
a profit logic:   
We went to China in 1999, first we did technology transfer then gradually we moved to demonstration 
projects and applied research and today we are continuing with broad European projects with Chinese 
[non-academic] partners. […] We have ambassadors all around the world in key positions with whom we 
continue to work and collaborate. We usually say "it’s a system that is working very well" [Int_8_Turin]. 
 
The four elements we point out may help us in understanding the misuse of a typical UTM tool 
such as the USO and its practical translation into a tool for making and supporting other 
activities compared to its original for profit mission. Observing unofficial reasons does not mean 
that in different situations the USO tool is used improperly and that there are no good practices 
concerning its activation. However, the spread of its surrogate use reveals some problematic 
aspects of everyday academic life to which professors and researchers try to find a solution. By 
introducing UTM tools - a fact that is legitimated and supported through the increasing emphasis 
and rhetoric placed on the UTM by policies of all three universities examined - academics can 
become more competitive in terms of personal careers, finding resources for research and in 
general improving the conditions in which they perform their daily academic work. From this 
point of view, a surrogate use of USOs is implemented because it appears to improve personal 
working conditions and to provide better opportunities for research. At the same time it is a 
factor, among others, that contributes to explaining why so few USOs succeed at significant 







































































Over the last two decades, emphasis on UTM and, more generally, on the engagement of 
researchers in the socio-economic sphere of life has seen a fast rise. Looking at the Italian case, 
we described a scenario of progressive institutionalization of such new functions which, 
nevertheless, demonstrates many weaknesses, ineffectiveness and a feeble impact on innovation 
and local economic development. In the article, first we have identified a number of factors that 
together can contribute to understanding the situation of scarce effectiveness of UTM outcomes 
in Italy; second, we have focused on the surrogate use of USOs, which we consider, among other 
factors, to be relevant in explaining this poor performance. 
Our argument has started from the discrepancy between the officially declared objectives adopted 
by the academic institution at the central level and the USO’s actual use at the peripheral level 
of any academic department. We have taken into account different factors in order to explain 
why the official declared goals of UTM policies are not actually achieved and, in particular, the article 
aimed to contribute to this debate shedding light on unofficial reasons at the basis of the use of USOs. 
Paying attention to their actual use, we observed that academics do not always seem to be 
interested in the economic success of USOs. Besides the appropriate start-up of new ventures, an 
alternative way of using them emerges as rather widespread. This surrogate use of USOs seems to 
be connected to the need to find better conditions for conducting research activity and 
overcoming old problems and constraints afflicting everyday academic life. According to the main 
insights from other studies (see section 2-3), we have seen that professors and researchers can thus 
attempt to solve problems related to the recruitment of young colleagues, and to the management 




































































is not yet present in the literature and that can be related to the well-known bureaucratic rigidity 
of Italian institutions: we refer to the need for more streamlined and efficient 
bureaucratic/administrative procedures. Another implication is that we have uncovered a 
surrogate use of USOs by examining three different universities (Turin, Florence, Cagliari), which 
have each developed policies for supporting the UTM by assuming a proactive attitude over time, 
and yet they are rooted in local contexts with a dissimilar economic dynamism and with a 
disparate intensity of public expenditure in the academic sector.  
It is, however, appropriate to ask whether this common occurrence in our three case studies is 
entirely because of the opportunism of some researchers pursuing their specific interest within a 
framework of loose rules or if this proliferation of the surrogate use of USOs is due to the features 
of the governance of universities. That the budgets of many of the USOs are not impressive is 
certainly not a secret, it is a publicly available information, well known to the leadership of the 
universities. Accordingly, the proliferation of such surrogate activities could be readily tackled by 
rectors or vice-rectors, which could, for instance, introduce restrictive criteria for the recognition 
of USOs. But, why did that not happen? Why did it not occur in our case studies? The most likely 
reason is that neither the rector nor the other university bodies have the will or the influence to 
bring the usage of academic enterprise back to its rightful function. First, within a higher 
education system ruled by a 'steering from a distance' mechanism (Neave and Van Vught, 1991) 
- which governs and funds the universities from the centre by monitoring their performances - 
the will to counter the flourishing of the surrogate use of USOs is dampened by the need to show 
a high degree of activism on UTM, at least formally.  
Second, the effort to create a system that effectively selects the best academic enterprises is 




































































have, and, above all, within a strict administrative system and continually shrinking resources. 
Moreover, the low innovativeness of the Italian economic systems makes the effort of creating 
fast-growing entrepreneurial initiatives harder. Therefore, it is unrealistic to think that in a 
context such as the Italian one, where universities are peripheral to the production system and 
where private investment in R&S is poor, the sole establishment of an incubator or a TTO can 
be sufficient to increase the contribution of universities to economic development  In most cases, 
the decision to promote USO incubators is, so far, a choice to create a ‘voodoo institution’ 
(Harrison and Leitch, 2010) on which universities irrationally pin their hopes in order to cope 
with isomorphic pushes towards the establishment of a more open and commercially oriented 
university. Last, even if the university leaders wanted to reduce the discrepancy between the 
declared UTM's goals and actual achievements, they would probably lack the influence to do so. 
Although the governance of European, and Italian, universities has undergone a strong pattern 
of 'corporatization' which consisted of concentrating decision-making on the top levels 
meanwhile reducing the role of self-government structures, the latter has shown a high degree of 
resilience (Capano et al., 2016). Since main decisions are still subject to compromise among 
academics, the choice to side against vested interests, such as those of some academic 
entrepreneurs, may not be simple. 
In conclusion, whereas in recent years the Italian higher education system has increased its 
contribution to economic development, interventions to promote academic entrepreneurship 
layered in a highly institutionalized context, and unintended consequence emerged. Together 
with the promotion of successful academic businesses, UTM policies encouraged the emergence 
of hybrid organizations, which straddle both traditional research activities and a commercial 




































































relevance of unofficial reasons is crucial in motivating academics to engage in UTM initiatives 
that should meet for-profit goals. Given the particular features of the Italian context, an 
interesting research direction to be developed in the future could be to verify whether these 
unofficial reasons are also present in countries characterized by a more flourishing national 
system of innovation. In addition, it would be worth exploring if the presence / absence of 
unofficial reasons can be associated with different institutional regulation at the national and 





































































1 For a systematic review of the literature on different for-profit UTM activities see, among others contributes, 
Agrawal (2001), Rothaermel et al. (2007), Djokovic and Souitaris (2008), Geuna and Muscio (2009), Teixeira and 
Mota (2012), Bozeman et al. (2013), Gherardini and Nucciotti (2017).  
2 Despite the fact that no agreed-upon definition of a USO emerges from the literature (Algieri et al. 2013), it is still 
possible to rely on the clarifying work of Pirnay and colleagues (2004) which considers academic spin-offs to be new 
companies created by faculties to exploit the knowledge produced by academic activities in a profit-making 
perspective. 
3 The Research Project of National Interest (PRIN) ‘University, Innovation and Regional Economies’ aimed to 
examine the spread of UTM activities across Italian regions, namely the contribution of the academic institutions to 
innovation and the development of local and regional economies. The project involved four research units (from 
Univ. of Florence, Univ. of Milan, Univ. of Pavia and Univ. of Turin) in a broad three-year research agenda (2013-
2016).  
4 The best-known examples are VINNÄXT in Sweden, Launchpad in the UK, Brainport in the Netherlands, the Cluster 
of Excellence in Germany and, of course, the Pôles de compétitivité in France. 
5 The National Agency for the Evaluation of Universities and Research Institutes (ANVUR) periodically evaluates 
both research and UTM activities. Data in the text refer to the first evaluation of research quality (2004-2010). For 
more details see www.anvur.org.  
6 Data on USOs that are presented in this section refer to 981 USOs listed in the ANVUR census of 2013 that 
stemmed from 59 public universities. We excluded non-state universities, online universities and universities which 
do not provide graduate or undergraduate courses. The census refers to all companies officially recognized by 
universities as USOs between 2004 to 2013. The annual financial statements have been collected through the AIDA 
- Bureau Van Dijk archive. Searching for 2013 or 2014 budget sheets, we found 806 entries. However, the total 
number of firms we included in our elaboration is 706 because we excluded 46 firms which went into liquidation. 
7 By adopting the Italian Business Register definition of innovative start-ups (Law no. 221/2012), we consider USOs 
to be start-up companies if were four or fewer years old in the year we collected the financial statement. 
8 The Italian reform of the intellectual property (IP) code was paradoxically radically different from what was 
introduced in other countries (except for Sweden) to assure universities the ownership of intellectual property 
resulting from public research (i.e. the Bayh-Dole Act). In Italy, the ownership of invention stemming from public 
research is mainly in the hands of the researchers, although the IP code was partially changed in 2005 (Granieri, 
2010).  
9 Italian universities are ranked into four groups according to the number of students enrolled: up to 15,000 small; 
from 15,000 to 40,000 mid; over 40,000 large. The three universities are all classified as large although the University 
of Cagliari is smaller than the other two (ANVUR, 2016). Moreover, despite the peculiarity of being on the Sardinian 
island, this university has expanded UTM activities both in strengthening technology transfer on its territory at the 
local level and in developing synergies with other Italian universities. 
 



































































                                                                                                                                                                                     
10 Regarding the three universities examined in this article, the investigation was conducted in the departments listed 
here: University of Turin: Dept. of Molecular Biotechnology and Health Sciences; Dept.  of Agricultural, Forest and 
Food Sciences; Dept. of Psychology; Dept. of Management. University of Florence: Dept. of Chemistry; Dept. of 
Information Engineering; Dept. of Architecture (Design); Dept. of Education and Psychology. University of Cagliari: 
Dept. of Electrical and Electronic Engineering; Dept. of Environmental and Life Science; Dept. of Economic and 
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TABLE 1. Yearly sale revenues of Italian USOs (2013 or last year available) 
Sale revenues* 
% USOs 
(total, n = 760) 
% start-up USOs  
(<= 4-years, n = 351) 
% elder USOs  
(> 4-years, n= 409) 
0 15,0 16,2 13,9 
1-100.000 45,1 58,1 34,0 
100.001-500.000 29,5 22,8 35,2 
500.001-1.000.000 6,1 2,3 9,3 
1.000.001-2.000.000 2,5 0,3 4,4 
> 2.000.000 1,8 0,3 3,2 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 




Table Click here to download Table Tables & Appendix_All that




TABLE 2. A profile of the three academic institutions examined. 
 University of Turin University of Florence University of Cagliari 
Dimension Large Large Large 
Territorial area North Centre South 
No. enrolled students (2014/5) 10,621 8,208 3,399 
No. professors/researchers (2016) 1,921 1,653 971 
No. Dept. (2016) 27 24 16 
Engineering Dept. (2016) No Yes Yes 
Degree offer Generalist Generalist Generalist 
No. Research Centres (2016) 34 77 12 
TTO (year) 2001 2003 2005 
Budget TTO (€) 50,000 371,806 0 
Staff TTO (2016) 3 10,5 6 
No. Incubators (year) 1 (2003) 1 (2011) 0 
No. patents (2011-13) 72 53 20 
No. spin-offs (2013) 31 22 20 
Subcontracting value (2013, €) 90,018,157 16,195,974 7,806,361 
Emphasis on Third Mission High Medium Medium 
Source: Our elaboration on MIUR (Ministry of Education, University and Research – Italy) and 





APPENDIX. List of interviewed for each case study. 












Int_1_Turin Vice-Rector for research academic 
Int_2_Turin Vice-Rector for internal and external communication academic 
Int_3_Turin Vice-Rector for applied research academic 
Int_4_Turin TTO Director academic staff 
Int_5_Turin Director, Research and International Relations Office academic 
Int_6_Turin Director, University Spin-off and Technology Transfer Incubator academic staff 
Int_7_Turin Director, Dept. of Agriculture, Forest and Food Science academic 
Int_8_Turin Professor, Dept. of Agriculture, Forest and Food Science academic 
Int_9_Turin Vice-Director, Dept. of Molecular Biotechnology and Health Sc. 
zeScien 
academic 
Int_10_Turin Professor, Dept. of Molecular Biotechnology and Health Sc. academic 
Int_11_Turin Director, Dept. of Management academic 
Int_12_Turin Professor, Dept. of Management academic 
Int_13_Turin Vice-Director, Dept. of Psychology academic 
Int_14_Turin Professor, Dept. of Psychology academic 
Int_15_Turin Staff, University and Enterprises Office academic staff 
Int_16_Turin 
 
Director, Public-private technology transfer organization no academic 
 Int_17_Turin Director, Public-private technology transfer organization no academic 
 Int_18_Turin Staff, Agency for technological innovation and research no academic 
no academic  Int_19_Turin Staff, Agency for technological innovation and research  aca e ic 
 Int_20_Turin 
 












Int_1_Florence Director, University Job placement office academic staff 
Int_2_Florence Director, University Research and Technology Transfer services academic staff 
Int_3_Florence Vice-Rector for Technology Transfer and local affairs academic 
Int_4_Florence Director, University spin-off incubator academic staff 
Int_5_Florence Director, Dept. of Chemistry academic 
Int_6_Florence Director, Dept. of Education and Psychology academic 
Int_7_Florence Director, Dept. of Architecture academic 
Int_8_Florence Director, Dept. of Industrial Engineering academic 
Int_9_Florence President, Chamber of Commerce no academic 
Int_10_Florence Staff, Private start-up incubator no academic 
Int_11_Florence Director, Public start-up incubator no academic 
Int_12_Florence Director, Public-private technology transfer organization no academic 
Int_13_Florence Key informant on regional innovation policies no academic 
Int_14_Florence Entrepreneur, local firm (ICT) no academic 
Int_15_Florence Professor, Dept. of Chemistry academic 
Int_16_Florence 
 
Professor, Dept. of Education and Psychology academic 
Int_17_Florence Professor, Dept. of Architecture academic 
Int_18_Florence Professor, Dept. of Industrial Engineering academic 
Int_19_Florence Entrepreneur, local firm (jewellery) no academic 
Int_20_Florence 
 












Int_1_Cagliari Professor, Dept. of Economics academic 
Int_2_Cagliari Director, Dept. of Life and Environmental Sciences academic 
Int_3_Cagliari President of private technology transfer consortium no academic 
Int_4_Cagliari Director, Dept. of Electrical and Electronic Engineering academic 
Int_5_Cagliari Vice-Rector for innovation and local affairs academic 
Int_6_Cagliari Director, University Industrial Liaison Office academic staff 
Int_7_Cagliari Director, Dept. of History, cultural heritage, geographic science academic 
Int_8_Cagliari Staff., Public technology transfer consortium no academic 
Int_9_Cagliari Professor, Dept. of Electrical and Electronic Engineering academic 
Int_10_Cagliari Director, Private start-up incubator no academic 
Int_11_Cagliari Director, Private start-up incubator and venture capitalist no academic 
Int_12_Cagliari Director, University Job placement office academic staff 
Int_13_Cagliari Staff, University Industrial Liaison Office academic staff 
Int_14_Cagliari Professor, Dept. of Life and Environmental Sciences academic 
Int_15_Cagliari Professor, Dept. of History, cultural heritage, geographic science academic 
Int_16_Cagliari 
 




Int_17_Cagliari Professor, Dept. of Economics academic 
Int_18_Cagliari Entrepreneur, local start-up (aerospace) no academic 
Int_19_Cagliari Entrepreneur, local firm (agriculture) no academic 
Int_20_Cagliari 
 
Entrepreneur, local start-up (credit) no academic 
 
 
 
